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Abstract
The sources of preference uncertainty in contingent valuation (CV) studies  have rarely been 
investigated from a theoretical standpoint. This paper proposes a holistic theoretical framework 
of preference uncertainty that combines microeconomic theory with the theories of cognitive 
psychology. Empirical testing of the proposed theoretical model was carried out in Australia in 
the context of a national ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS)’ to be introduced in 2010. 
Two separate ordered probit models for a certainty score associated with CV ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
responses  were  estimated. The  results  of  the  estimated  regression  models  provide  evidence 
supporting the hypotheses drawn from the theoretical model. 
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1. Introduction
Empirical evidence in the contingent valuation (CV) literature over the past 15 years suggests 
that respondents are uncertain about their responses (Ready et al., 1995; Champ et al., 1997; 
Alberini et al., 2003). Hanemann et al. (1996) proposed a welfare model that incorporates an 
element  of  uncertainty  in  behavioral  intentions  and  individual  responses  to  hypothetical  or 
experimental  market  situations.  Hanemann  et  al.  (1996)  argued  that  individuals  do  not 
necessarily know their true willingness to pay (WTP*) for a good with certainty. Rather, they
perceive that the true value of the good lies within an interval {WTP*- , WTP* + } where ‘’ 
refers to the unknown component of preference (>0). Building upon the framework proposed by 
Hanemann et al. (1996), Li and Mattsson (1995) extended the theory of preference uncertainty 
by defining preference uncertainty as a stochastic error term. Li and Mattsson (1995) argued that 
ignoring preference uncertainty in stated preference studies may result in measurement bias and 
they, therefore, proposed a numerical scale to measure uncertainty in preferences.
According to the utility difference model proposed by Hanemann (1984), a respondent agrees to 
pay if at a certain bid level (BID), the deterministic utility from obtaining an environmental good 
(V=1) by paying BID exceeds the base line utility from not obtaining the good (V=0) by more 
than the difference in the stochastic part of utility (
0 1    ), i.e. 
0 1 0 1 ) , 0 ( ) , 1 (           Y V V BID Y V V V        (1)
where  V  represents  the  change  in  utility  between  the  baseline  (
0 V )  and  the  provision  of 
environmental good (
1 V ) and Y is income. Maximum WTP (MAX WTP) is an amount that 
makes  the  respondents  indifferent  between  V=1  and  V=0  by  setting  V  =0.  Loomis  and 5
Ekstrand (1998) argued that the level of individual preference uncertainty is determined by the 
magnitude  of  difference  between  the  deterministic  and  the  stochastic  parts  of  the  utility 
difference function. The greater the proximity of the stochastic part to the deterministic part, the 
higher is the experienced uncertainty in respondent preferences. When BID is substantially lower
or substantially  higher  than  the  MAX  WTP,  the  deterministic  part 
( ) , 0 ( ) , 1 (
0 1 Y V V BID Y V V     ) would exceed  the stochastic part  (
0 1    ) of the utility
difference function in Equation 1 by a sufficiently large amount to make the respondents feel 
certain  about  their  answers.  On  the  other  hand,  when  BID  is  close  to  the MAX  WTP,  the
difference in the deterministic part of utility would be close in magnitude to the difference in the 
stochastic part of utility, making the respondent uncertain as to whether they would answer ‘Yes’ 
or  ‘No’.  This  proposition  closely  corresponds  to  Wang’s  (1997)  argument that  respondents 
experience  the  highest  level  of  uncertainty  at  the  middle  bid  and  relatively  lower  level  of 
uncertainty at high bid and low bid. In essence, these propositions suggest that the relationship 
between BID and preference uncertainty is quadratic function, i.e. ceteris paribus, as bid level 
increases, preference uncertainty increases; preference uncertainty reaches at a maximum point 
at middle bid level and falls as bid level continues to increase. 
There is limited empirical evidence (Champ and Bishop, 2001; Samneliev et al., 2006; Akter et 
al., forthcoming) to support the quadratic relationship hypothesis and theoretical development of 
the concept of preference uncertainty has not progressed beyond this point. The explanatory 
variables  that  have  been  included  in  the  econometric  models  aimed  at  explain  variations  in 
preference uncertainty have been more intuitive than theoretically based. This study proposes a 
theoretical  framework  to  underpin  the  sources  of  preference  uncertainty  in  CV  studies. 
Psychological  theories  explaining  cognitive  uncertainty  are used  as  a  basis  to  develop  the 6
theoretical  model.  Empirical  testing  of  the  proposed  theoretical  model  was  carried  out  in 
Australia in the context of a national ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS)’. About 300
households were asked for their willingness to bear extra household expenditure to support the 
CPRS using a single bounded dichotomous choice (DC) elicitation format. A post-decisional 
confidence rating scale, first constructed by Li and Mattson (1995), was used to measure the 
level of uncertainty experienced by the respondents while answering the DC WTP question. Two 
separate ordered probit regression models on the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses were estimated to test 
the theoretical model outlined in the paper. 
The next section of the paper provides a review of the preference uncertainty literature followed 
by a discussion of theories in cognitive psychology in Section 3. A description of the case study 
and a discussion of the survey results are provided in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. 
Section 6 discusses the empirical findings and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature review
In this section the results of econometric models estimated to establish a causal relationship 
between the levels of preference uncertainty and one or a group of theoretically and intuitively 
expected explanatory variables are discussed. To date, four studies have estimated a preference 
uncertainty model by regressing the self reported certainty scores against explanatory variables. 
Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) estimated an ordinary least  square regression  model  on pooled 
(both ‘Yes' and ‘No' responses) data. Champ and Bishop (2001) and Akter et al. (forthcoming) 
estimated  ordered  probit  regression  models  whereas  Samneliev  et  al.  (2006)  estimated  two 
logistic regression models separately for ‘Yes' and ‘No' responses.7
Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) conducted a mail survey of 1600 US households where respondents 
were asked to indicate their WTP for preserving the Mexican Spotted Owl and its critical habitat. 
A follow-up DC certainty scale was used to elicit respondents’ levels of certainty regarding their 
responses to the WTP question. The authors found a quadratic relationship between the self 
reported certainty levels with the bid levels. This implies that, ceteris paribus, at low and high 
bids respondents were more certain about their responses and less certain at the intermediate bid
levels.  Furthermore,  Loomis  and  Ekstrand  (1998) found  statistically  significant,  positive
relationships between certainty scores and respondents’ prior knowledge  about the particular 
endangered species and their visiting the area proposed for protection. 
The studies by Champ and Bishop (2001) and Samneliev et al. (2006) failed to provide similar 
empirical evidence. Instead they indicate that self reported certainty scores reflect respondents'
attitudes towards the hypothetical market (a form of protest response). Champ and Bishop (2001) 
examined  household  preferences  for  a  voluntary  wind  energy  program  provided  by  a  local 
private  electricity  utility  by  surveying  2,500  of  their  customers.  Like  Loomis  and  Ekstrand 
(1998), a follow-up DC certainty scale was applied to measure the level of certainty. Respondent 
perception of and attitude towards the proposed program were found to be responsible for the 
observed variation in the self-reported certainty scores. Respondents in favour of the program 
and  willing  to  pay  the  extra  cost  expressed  higher  certainty  levels  than  other  respondents. 
Samnaliev  et  al.  (2005)  asked  1,600  households  in  New  Hampshire  and  Idaho  for  their 
preferences for paying a user fee to access public land. The same follow-up DC certainty scale 
was used to measure respondents’ levels of certainty about their decision to pay.  Similar results 
were found in  this  study to  those of  Champ  and  Bishop (2001). Respondents  who objected 
against the imposed user fees in principle were more certain in rejecting the bid than others, 8
reflecting respondent  general attitude towards the hypothetical market, usually referred to as 
protest response in CV. 
Akter et al. (forthcoming) conducted a double bounded CV study where more than 400 air travel 
passengers from around the world were interviewed face-to-face at Amsterdam Schiphol airport 
about their preferences for a tree plantation program to offset their contribution to greenhouse 
gas  emissions.  A  five  category  polychotomous  choice  question  format  (Extremely  unlikely, 
Fairly unlikely, Not sure, Fairly likely, Extremely likely) was used to ask the respondents if they 
would actually pay the stated WTP value should the carbon travel tax be voluntary. The authors 
find a significant negative relationship between start bid and the stated likelihood of paying a 
voluntary tax. This finding partly supports Loomis and Ekstrand (1998)’s proposition regarding 
the bid level being a source of preference uncertainty. However, no significant quadratic effect 
was detected as suggested by Loomis and Ekstrand (1998). The study, furthermore, provides 
evidence which supports the relationship between respondent attitudes, perceptions and stated 
likelihood of paying which is consistent with the findings reported by Champ and Bishop (2001) 
and Samnaliev et al. (2005). A respondent’s perceived individual responsibility for contributing 
to  climate  change,  attitude  towards  paying  to  protect  the  environment  and  belief  in  the 
effectiveness of the proposed tree plantation program on climate change mitigation were found 
to be the main sources of stated uncertainty. 
3. Development of a theoretical preference uncertainty model 
3.1 Theories in cognitive psychology9
A theoretical model of preference uncertainty is proposed in this section which builds upon the 
empirical results discussed in the previous section. The concept of ‘preference uncertainty’ is 
defined here as a form of cognitive uncertainty. Cognitive uncertainty refers to agents’ lack of 
confidence about the validity of the results of their own information processing (Clausing, 2000). 
More specifically, it refers to uncertainty due to possible errors in the cognitive processes of the 
problem  solver  in  the  human  neuro-cognitive  system  that  produces  information  for  decision 
making (Schunn et al., 2000). The cognitive information processing model proposed by Hogarth 
(1987) describes how decision makers encode, store, transform, and retrieve information before 
generating  a  response.  After  an  agent  receives  information  from  an  external  source,  the 
information is first extracted, encoded, stored and transformed into memory and then retrieved 
from memory to take the necessary course of action (Hogarth, 1987). The end outcome of this 
cognitive procedure is a ‘decision’. Errors occur during these phases of translating information 
into decision action which in turn gives rise to uncertainty about the final decision (Schunn et al., 
2000). These errors are due to inherent limits of human cognition. 
Chaiken’s (1980, 1987) Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) of information processing provides 
more insight of the sources of errors. According to HSM, information processing may follow two
fundamental modes, namely heuristic and systematic. Heuristic information processing involves 
the use of simple decision rules for judging information while systematic information processing 
involves  a  comprehensive  effort  to  scrutinize,  analyze  and  understand  information.  The  key 
aspect  of  heuristic  information  processing  is  the  idea  that  relatively  simple  heuristics,  e.g., 
previous knowledge or attitude, can be useful ingredients in reaching a quick, low-cost decision 
especially when the decision maker is dealing with complex, uncertain, or unfamiliar situations 10
(Chaiken et al., 1989). Essentially, systematic processing requires more cognitive capacity than 
heuristic  processing  and  therefore,  systematic  processing  is  assumed  to  be  generally more 
effective  in  reducing  errors  occurring  at  the  information  processing  stages  than  heuristic 
processing (Zuckerman and Chaiken, 1998). Systematic information processing occurs when an 
individual possesses adequate levels of cognitive capacity and motivation (Chaiken et al., 1989)
whereas reliance on heuristic process increases under time pressure and lack of prior experience 
with the decision context (Ratneshwar and Chaiken, 1991).
3.2 Preference uncertainty in CV
In the light of this cognitive psychology theory, a theoretical model of preference uncertainty can 
be constructed in the form presented in Figure 1. In a CV study, a respondent is presented with a 
hypothetical valuation framework where they are provided with information about the current 
condition of a non-market good, the potential deterioration of the state of the good if no future
action is undertaken and a monetary cost of the potential action to be borne by the respondent in 
conjunction with the community or the society. In some instances, the information supplied to 
the respondent may be more complex if the valuation framework involves a provision rule, cheap 
talk  script  or  more  than  one  possible  future  scenario.  Upon  receipt  of  the  potentially  large 
volume  of information, the respondents engage in  the cognitive procedure  of translating the 
information into a WTP choice.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE11
As the psychological literature suggests, errors are inevitable during the translation process and 
therefore, respondents are not expected to be fully confident of their final choice. Preference 
uncertainty is a positive function of these errors. The more errors experienced by the respondents 
during the information processing stage, the lower is expected to be their stated certainty score. 
However, the magnitude of the errors, and therefore the level of preference uncertainty, depends 
on the information processing mode used by the respondents. Theory suggests that when an 
individual has little experience or knowledge about the topic at hand (Wood et al., 1985) or is 
under time pressure (Ratneshwar and Chaiken, 1991), the heuristic mode will dominate over the 
systematic mode. A CV context involves limited or no prior purchase experience with the good 
and very few if any market signals are available during the survey. In particular, a DC elicitation 
format does not offer the repetition, learning and experience possibilities of real markets which 
Bateman  et  al.  (2004)  consider  as  a  contradiction  of  the  Discovered  Preference  Hypothesis 
(DPH) (Plott, 1996). The central argument of the DPH is that decision makers gain experience 
through  practice  and  repetition  which  in  turn  helps  to  formulate  stable  and  theoretically 
consistent preferences. Furthermore, in some CV studies, the good in question is intangible (for 
example protection of a rare bird species in a distant location, mitigation of climate change).  As 
a result, systematic information processing is less plausible in CV studies. Respondents who take 
part in CV surveys, therefore, predominantly tend to rely on heuristic information processing 
mode to reach a decision (Bateman et al., 2004).
Empirical  studies suggest  that  respondents  use  bid  level,  attitudes  and  prior  experience  as 
heuristics  to  process  information  (Loomis  and  Ekstrand,  1998;  Champ  and  Bishop,  2001; 
Samneliev et al., 2006; Akter et al., forthcoming). Bid level serves as an important information 12
processing heuristics within  the decision making  framework of  a  CV  study. Microeconomic 
theory suggests that an individual decides to purchase a good when the marginal cost of the 
outcome is less than individual’s expected marginal benefit (WTP*). A sufficiently high or low 
bid serves as guidance for respondents, i.e. for a ‘Yes’ response, Bid – WTP* < δ and for a 
‘No’ response, Bid – WTP* > δ where ‘’ refers to the unknown component of preference 
(>0). Therefore, the higher (lower) the offered bid level, the lower is the error (lower preference 
uncertainty) for a ‘No’ (‘Yes’) response. 
Respondents’  attitudes  towards  the  valuation  problem  in  question  can  guide  the  conceptual 
cognitive  processes  by  determining  the  decision  to  be  taken.  This  process  is  known  as  an 
‘attitude heuristic’ in the psychology literature. It refers to a decision rule that uses an evaluative 
relationship  as  a  cue  in  the  problem  solving  strategy  (Pratkanis,  1989).  A  positive  attitude 
towards an issue invokes a decision in favour of the policy (a ‘Yes’ response) whereas a negative 
attitude influences rejection (a ‘No’ response). However, respondents can hold both positive and 
negative evaluation of a given attitude object at the same time (Kaplan, 1972), a state known as 
‘ambivalence’ in the psychology literature. Ambivalence is resolved by focusing on one side of 
the evaluative conflict (Nordgren et al., 2006) or by making a choice between the opposing 
behavioral beliefs. However, dissonance
1 – a state of psychological discomfort – can occur after 
the ambivalent attitude holder makes a decision. Festinger (1964) argued that after making a 
decision,  individuals  tend  to  focus  their attention  on  the  unfavorable  aspects  of  the  chosen 
alternative and on the desirable aspects of the rejected alternatives. People experience dissonance
especially when they feel responsible for the negative consequences of their behavior (Scher and 
                                                
1 The difference between ambivalence and dissonance is that the former is a pre-decisional phenomenon, while the 
later concerns post-decisional conflict between attitudes and behavior (Harreveld et al., 2009).13
Cooper, 1989). Dissonance is expected to manifest itself in the information processing errors. 
More specifically, in the presence of ambivalence, net errors occurring from the information 
translation process are expected to be higher and vice versa. 
In  summary,  we  argue  that  preference  uncertainty  is  a  form  of  cognitive  uncertainty where 
cognitive  uncertainty  refers  to  individuals’  lack  of  confidence  about  their  decisions.  Such 
uncertainty (or lack of confidence) arises in CV responses due to errors occurring at various 
stages of the cognitive information process. In a conventional CV survey, respondents tend to 
employ  some  common  heuristics,  e.g.  bid  level  (BID),  attitude  (ATT),  experience 
(EXP)/knowledge (KNOWD), to minimize errors and attain higher levels of certainty (C) about 
their  decisions.  The  presence  of  ambivalent  attitudes  (AMB)  contributes  to  the  errors and
invokes  dissonance,  therefore,  lowering  stated  certainty  scores.  The  argument  can  be 
summarized in the form of the following equation: 
AMB KNOWD EXP ATT BID C 5 4 3 2 1                               (2)
where  is constant,  i  s are regression coefficient. 
In this model, the sign of  1  , the coefficient of BID, is expected to differ for ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
responses. For ‘Yes’ certainty scores,  1   is expected to be negative (higher the bid level, lower 
is the certainty score of a ‘Yes’ response) whereases for ‘No’ certainty scores, the sign of  1   is 
expected to be positive (higher the bid level, higher is the certainty score of a ‘No’ response). For 
estimation purpose, we define ATT (attitude) as a set of beliefs and perceptions held by the 
decision  makers  that  is  consistent  with  the  DC  CV  decision  (a  ‘Yes’  or  a  ‘No’  response). 
Likewise, AMB (ambivalence) is defined as a set of beliefs and perceptions that is contradictory 14
to the decision made by an individual in a DC CV framework. Therefore, the null and alternative 
hypotheses to be tested in the paper in relation to ATT and AMB can be written in the following 
forms:
0 : 2 0   H  and  0 : 2   A H
0 : 0 : 0 : 5 0 5 5 0       A H and HH   and 0 : 5   A H
Prior knowledge and experience of the good being valued are expected to be positively related to 
stated certainty scores. Thus:      
0 : 3 0   H  and  0 : 3   A H
0 : 4 0   H   and 0 : 4   A H
4. Case study description
The case study selected involves an investigation of Australian households’ preferences towards
the occurrence and mitigation of anthropocentric climate change. As part of fulfillment of its 
Kyoto  protocol  obligations,  the  Australian  Government  has  recently  proposed  a  national 
emissions trading scheme known as the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). The aims 
of the CPRS are to reduce emissions by 60 per cent of the 2000 level by 2050 and to encourage 
the development and use of emission free technologies (Department of Climate Change, 2008).
The implementation of the CPRS will affect Australian households as the prices of a wide range 
of emission-intensive goods and services are expected to rise. The case study aimed to explore 
Australian households’ willingness to bear extra expenses to support the CPRS. 
A web-based CV survey was conducted with 300 respondents in Sydney from the third week of 
November 2008 until the first week of December 2008. In total, the questionnaire consisted of 35 15
questions.  The  questionnaire  was  primarily  developed  based  on  a  series  of  focus  group 
discussions with up to 12 participants in each session. During the first focus group, participants 
were asked to provide feedback on the level of comprehensibility of the information provided in 
the  questionnaire.  Participants,  were  furthermore,  asked  if  the  questionnaire  appeared  to  be 
biasing  their  responses.  Based  on  the  feedback  received  from  the  first  focus  group,  the 
questionnaire was revised and tested in a second round of focus groups. Before pilot testing, the 
questionnaire was sent to two climate change policy experts
2 in Australia in order to ensure that 
the information included in the questionnaire was consistent with existing scientific knowledge 
and policy prescriptions. 
In the valuation part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked if they would be willing to 
bear extra expenses per month on behalf of their household to support the CPRS. Increases in the 
prices of goods and services were used as a payment vehicle. Eight different bids ranging from 
AUS$20 to AUS$400 per month per household were randomly assigned across the respondents. 
These  bid  amounts  were  selected  based  on  responses  obtained  from  an  open-ended  WTP 
question during the first round focus group. The bid amounts were tested in a second round of 
focus groups and a pilot survey. A follow-up numerical certainty scale (1-not at all certain to 10-
very certain) was used to elicit respondents’ levels of certainty about their decisions to pay (not 
to pay). 
5. General survey results
                                                
2 Dr. Frank Jotzo and Dr Stephen Howes are gratefully acknowledged for their inputs. 16
54 percent of the respondents participated in the online survey were female. The average age of 
the respondents’ was about 34 years. One third of the respondents had completed university 
education, while another third had a trade certificate. The rest had completed high school. Over 
two thirds of the sample respondents were employed when the survey was conducted. Half of the 
employed respondents were working full time. Median yearly household income was within the 
range of AUS$67,600 to AUS$83,199 with about a quarter of the sample households earning 
more than AUS$104,000 per year. The sample median household income was higher than the 
true population median household income of AUS$57,600 per year (ABS, 2006).  
Although over eighty percent of the respondents had heard of ‘Kyoto protocol’ and one third of 
them knew the protocol’s objectives, a majority (82 percent) of the respondents had not heard of 
Intergovernmental Panel  of Climate  Change (IPCC).  Over eighty percent  of the respondents 
were familiar with the concept of ‘carbon offset’ while over ten percent of them purchased a 
carbon offset certificate. On average, respondents spent $85 on carbon offset certificate over the 
period of twelve months prior to the survey. Most of these offset certificates were purchased to 
counterbalance  carbon  footprints  from  air  travelling  (54  percent),  followed  by  electricity 
consumption (43 percent) and use of motorized vehicle (16 percent). 
Whilst more than half of the respondents (57 percent) had heard about the CPRS prior to the 
survey, a majority (83 percent) did not know when the CPRS would be implemented. Around 
two thirds of those who claimed that they knew when the CPRS  would be implemented (5
percent of the total sample) could correctly indicate the proposed implementation year of the 
CPRS. Respondents’ knowledge of the Kyoto protocol and the CPRS were positively correlated 17
(r=0.221, p<0.001) implying that respondents who were informed about the Kyoto protocol were 
also aware of the CPRS. Likewise, a low but statistically significant positive correlation was 
observed between respondents’ knowledge of the CPRS and carbon offset (r=0.118, p<0.001).
This implies that respondents who were familiar with carbon offset were also familiar with the 
CPRS. 
When asking the respondents how concerned they were about the impact of climate change in 
Australia, less than a quarter (20 percent) of the respondents indicated that they were “highly
concerned”. The majority (40 percent) were “concerned”. About a third of the respondents said 
that they were “somewhat concerned” while around ten percent of the respondents were “not so 
concerned” or “not at all concerned” about climate change. While the respondents were asked to 
rank five policy issues (climate change, education, health care, law and order and the economy) 
in Australia according to their level of relative importance, they personally attach to them, 12 
percent of the respondents ranked climate change as the most important policy issue in Australia. 
About  a  third  of  the  respondents  indicated  the  economy  is  the  most  important  policy  issue 
whereas less than a third felt that health care facilities ought to be the top priority. Respondents’ 
levels of concern about climate change and the level of relative importance they attached to 
climate change as a policy issue, as expected, were positively correlated (r=0.301, p<0.001). This 
implies that the respondents who were highly concerned about the impact of climate change in 
Australia attached a higher level of importance to climate change relative to other competing 
policy issues. Respondents varied in terms of their level of agreement with the statement that 
climate change is caused by human activities. Over a quarter (27 percent) of the respondents 
expressed  strong  agreement  while  almost  half  of  the  sample  respondents  (49  percent) 18
demonstrated a moderate level of agreement. Sixteen percent of the respondents neither agreed 
nor disagreed and the rest opposed the idea. 
6. Results concerning to preference uncertainty
6.1 Uncertainty in preferences 
About a third of respondents indicated the highest level of certainty (certainty score of 10) for
their decisions while almost three quarters of the self-reported certainty scores were above five 
(on a scale of one to 10). Other empirical studies in the CV literature present similar evidence 
(Loomis and Ekstrand, 1998; Li and Mattsson, 1995; Samneliev et al., 2006). Samneliev et al. 
(2006) explain  this tendency  as respondents’ attempts  to  avoid or deny self-contradiction or 
cognitive dissonance. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of self reported certainty scores across 
‘Yes’  and  ‘No’  responses.  Over  40  percent  of  the  respondents  who  said  ‘No’  to  the  WTP 
question were very certain about their decisions as opposed to less than 20 percent of the ‘Yes’ 
respondents  who  were  very  certain.  Hence,  the  respondents  who  replied  ‘No’  to  the  WTP 
question  stated  significantly  (Chi  square=28.64,  p<0.001)  higher  certainty  scores than  the 
respondents  who  replied  ‘Yes’.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Loomis  and 
Ekstrand (1998) where the authors showed that, in general, ‘No’ responses tend to be held with 
greater certainty scores than ‘Yes’ responses.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
The  distribution  of certainty  scores  across  bid  levels  was  tested  for  both  ‘Yes’  and  ‘No’ 
responses. The self reported certainty scores equal to or below five for ‘Yes’ responses were 19
found to be significantly (Chi square=39.11, p<0.08) differently distributed across the bid levels, 
i.e., the lower the bid level the higher was the certainty score. No significant difference was 
observed in the certainty scores above 5 for a ‘Yes’ response and the bid level. A statistically 
significant linear association (r =0.13, p<0.08) was observed between the certainty scores of 
‘No’ responses and the bid levels. This implies that, on average, respondents who were offered 
relatively higher bid level were significantly more certain about their decisions of not paying 
than respondents who were offered relatively lower bid level. Unlike the ‘Yes’ responses, no 
significant difference in the distribution of certainty scores for a ‘No’ response and the bid level
was observed for certainty scores below or above five.
Respondents who stated a certainty score less than 10, were asked to indicate reasons for being 
uncertain  about  their  responses  in  a  follow-up  question. The  majority  (31 percent)  gave
uncertainty regarding their future financial state as the reason for being uncertain about their 
decision. About a fifth of the respondents said that they preferred to reduce their carbon footprint 
by consuming less carbon intensive products instead of incurring extra household expenditure to 
support the CPRS. Eighteen percent of respondents indicated that they were not fully convinced 
about  the  success  of  the  CPRS  in  mitigating  climate  change,  seventeen  percent  expressed 
uncertainty about their future employment status and 11 percent indicated that they disliked the 
idea of placing a monetary value on climate change. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the 
reasons for being uncertain across ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses. A significantly larger proportion of 
respondents who  declined  to  pay  for the  CPRS  mentioned ‘I  am uncertain about my future 
financial state’ (Chi square=3.57, p<0.10) and ‘I did not like the idea of placing a monetary value 
on  climate  change’ (Chi  square=4.21, p<0.05)  as  reasons  for  the  experienced uncertainty  in 20
preference  than  respondents  who  said  ‘Yes’  to  the  WTP  question.  No  other  statistically 
significant difference was observed across the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses and stated reasons for 
not being fully certain.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
The original ‘Yes’ responses were recoded based on four different certainty scale cut-off points, 
a  calibration  technique  first  used  by  Champ  et  al.  (1997).  Univariate  logit  WTP  estimates 
obtained from different certainty scale cut-off points are presented in Table 1. Referendum CVM 
programs written by Cooper (1999) in GAUSS were used to estimate the Krinsky and Robb 
confidence intervals for the point estimates of mean WTP. As expected, the calibrated mean 
WTP values are substantially lower than the mean WTP without certainty calibration. Stepwise 
inclusion of the different certainty scale cut-off points yields mean WTP values which are 41 
percent to 81 percent lower than the original DC mean WTP. The magnitudes of change in 
calibrated mean WTP values relative to the uncalibrated DC mean WTP estimates are consistent 
with the empirical findings summarized by Akter et al. (2008). The authors showed that eight 
point and ten point certainty calibrated mean WTP estimates were 39 percent to 86 percent lower 
than the uncalibrated mean WTP estimates (Akter et al., 2008). However, the range of efficiency 
loss as a consequence of certainty calibration observed in the current study (100% to 276%) is 
relatively larger than the range observed in other empirical studies (22% to 149 %) (Akter et al., 
2008).       
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE21
6.2 Determinants of preference uncertainty
These stated certainty scores are ordinal as they show that one respondent is more (or less) 
certain than another respondent. They do not provide any information about how high or how 
low the certainty level of one respondent is relative to another. The ordered probit model, first 
introduced by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), serves as an appropriate framework for statistical 
analysis in situations where the response variable is ordinal. An ordered probit regression model 
was  estimated  first  using  certainty  scores  of  both  ‘Yes’  and  ‘No’  responses  following  the 
approach applied by Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) and Champ and Bishop (2001). A variety of 
explanatory variables reflecting respondents’ attitude and perception towards climate change and 
climate  change  policy  was  included  in  the  model  using  statistical  backward  and  forward 
elimination  techniques  and  trial  and  error.  In  view of  the  quadratic  relationship  hypothesis 
proposed by Loomis and Ekstrand (1998), the bid level and a squared term of bid were included 
in the model. However, no statistically significant effect could be detected for these variables on 
the self reported certainty scores in the pooled (for both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses) model.
Two separate models for ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses were then estimated. This approach was first 
applied by Samneliev et al. (2006) where the authors estimated two separate  binary logistic 
regression models for ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses (the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the 
certainty score for the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response equals 10, 0 otherwise). However, we applied 
ordered probit regression model following Champ and Bishop (2001). Tables 2 and 3 summarise
the regression results for ‘Yes’ (n=102) and ‘No’ (n=204) responses respectively. In the ‘Yes-
certainty model’ presented in Table 2, income, attitude and concern for climate change were 
found to influence the level of self reported certainty scores. This implies that, ceteris paribus, 22
respondents with higher income levels were more certain about their decisions to pay for the 
CPRS  than  other  respondents.  Respondents  who  believed  that  climate  change  is  caused  by 
human action and were highly concerned about the impact of climate change on Australia, on 
average,  expressed  higher  levels  of  certainty  scores  about  their  decisions  to  pay  than  other 
respondents. ‘BID’ was not a significant factor.      
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
In  the  ‘No-certainty  model’  presented  in  Table  3,  the  coefficient  of  the  variable  BID,  as 
hypothesised, is positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level. This implies that, 
ceteris paribus, the higher the bid level, the higher was the stated certainty scores for a ‘No’ 
response. The  coefficient  of  the  variable  ‘HUMAN’  reflecting  respondents’  attitude  towards
climate change has, as expected, a negative sign. This implies that respondents who believed 
climate change is caused by human action but did not support paying for the CPRS, expressed 
lower certainty scores about their decisions.
Respondents’ perceptions regarding the scale of climate change (measured through subjective 
best  guess  of  temperature  rise  in  future) was  found to  have  a significant  influence  on  the 
certainty levels of a ‘No’ response. Respondents, who stated relatively higher best guesses about 
change in temperature in 2100 relative to the current year, were less certain about their decisions
of not paying for the CPRS. The relationship between the stated certainty scores and the scale of 
climate change is nonlinear as the square term of the expected best guess temperature rise is also 
statistically significant.  The sign of the coefficients  of the variable TEM_SQ  imply that the 
certainty level of a ‘No’ response decreases at an increasing rate with the rise in best guess 23
temperature rise. The stated certainty score of a ‘No’ response, furthermore, was found to vary 
across perceived climate change impacts. Respondents who believed that climate change would 
cause  loss  of  biodiversity  (an  indirect  impact)  expressed  higher  certainty scores about  their 
decision to not pay whereas respondents who believed that climate change will cause severe 
water shortage (a direct impact) expressed lower certainty scores.
Finally, respondents’  perception  about  the  effectiveness  of proposed  policy intervention  was
found to  be  highly statistically significant  in  determining the  stated  certainty levels of  ‘No’ 
responses. Respondents, who believed that the proposed climate policy will not be effective in 
curbing climate change, were significantly more certain about their decision to not pay than other 
respondents. This result corresponds to the findings documented by Akter et al. (forthcoming) 
where the authors found passengers’ perception about the effectiveness of the tree plantation 
program positively influencing their self reported likelihood of paying for the voluntary carbon 
travel tax.  
Although respondents’ prior knowledge about the good being valued was expected to have a 
positive  effect on  respondent  certainty (Loomis  and  Ekstrand,  1998), the  coefficients  of  the 
variable CPRS (respondents’ knowledge about the CPRS) were not statistically significant in any 
of the models presented in Table 2 and Table 3. It is important to note that none of the other CV 
studies  except Loomis  and  Ekstrand  (1998)  found  prior  knowledge  or  experience  to  have 
statistically significant impact on the self reported certainty scores. Such an empirical result 
appears  to  be  plausible  because  CV  studies  generally include  an  information  section  in  the 
questionnaire containing key descriptions of the good being valued and the policy measures 24
under consideration. As a result, respondents may be equally informed about the good and the 
policy when they answer the WTP question. 
7. Conclusions
It has been a decade since Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) presented their theoretical model of 
preference  uncertainty  where  they  described  preference  uncertainty  as  a  function  of  the 
proximity or disparity between the deterministic and stochastic parts of the utility difference 
function. Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) further argued that a respondent’s prior knowledge and 
experience of the good being valued significantly enhances the certainty level of their decisions.
Empirical studies over the past decade have provided little evidence to support the propositions 
put forward by Loomis and Ekstrand (1998). Empirical results indicate that the variation in self 
reported  certainty  scores  can  be  largely  explained  by  respondents’  attitudes  towards  the 
environmental problem and the proposed policy in combating the problem. However, to date, no
attempt has been made to build a theoretical framework around these empirical findings. This 
paper  offers  a  model  that  combines  microeconomic  theory  with  the  theories  of  cognitive 
psychology. Preference uncertainty is defined as a form of cognitive uncertainty that arises from 
the errors that occur at various stages of the information translation process. 
Like other empirical studies in preference uncertainty literature, the results of our study do not 
provide evidence in favour of Loomis and Ekstrand (1998)’s quadratic relationship hypothesis. 
We failed to find statistically significant relationship between the self reported certainty score 
and any of the theoretically or intuitively expected explanatory variables when a pooled model
(certainty scores of both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses were included as dependent variable) was 25
estimated. However, theoretically expected and empirically consistent results were found when 
the certainty scores for ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses were analysed separately. This implies that the 
underlying sources of preference uncertainty across ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses are different and 
therefore, more can be learnt if a separate estimation technique is applied instead of a pooled 
estimation technique. 
Due to the limited number of observations in our data for the ‘Yes’ certainty scores, the results 
explain little of the sources of variation in the self reported certainty scores. Nevertheless, the 
results provide some evidence in favour of the hypotheses. The results of the ‘Yes-certainty’ 
model suggest that income, attitude and level of concern influence the certainty level of a ‘Yes’ 
response. Although the sign of the coefficient of the variable BID was negative reflecting what 
was theoretically expected, the relationship was not statistically significant. However, we find 
statistically significant negative relationship between bid level and certainty scores of a ‘Yes’ 
response below the five point certainty score. This provides some evidence in favour of the
hypothesis that bid level and ‘Yes’ certainty scores are negatively related.    
We find a statistically significant, negative relationship between bid level and certainty scores of 
‘No’ responses. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the higher the offered bid level the higher was 
the stated certainty scores of a ‘No’ response. A statistically significant, positive relationship was 
found between the certainty scores  of ‘No’  responses  and respondents’  levels of confidence 
about the effectiveness of the CPRS (an attitudinal variable). Respondents who believed that the 
CPRS will not be effective in mitigating climate change stated higher certainty scores of a ‘No’ 
response. The results of the ‘No certainty’ model, furthermore, showed evidence supporting the 26
ambivalence hypothesis. First, respondents who believed that climate change is caused by human 
action  but  did  not  support  paying  for  the  CPRS,  stated  lower  certainty  scores  about  their 
decisions. Second, respondents who stated higher subjective expectation of the extent of climate 
change (through ‘best guess’ future temperature) expressed lower certainty scores about their 
decisions of not supporting the CPRS. These results imply that when decision and attitude are 
consistent with each other, respondents are more confident about their decisions. To the contrary, 
when  attitude  and  decision  contradict  each  other,  stated  certainty  scores  of  the  decisions
decrease.   
In summary, we have used this paper to set out a holistic theoretical framework for analysing 
preference uncertainty in CV studies. We propose, through testing our own analytical model, that 
such a line of theoretical development is more relevant in underpinning the sources of preference 
uncertainty than the existing theories which have provided little empirical support of theoretical
expectations to date. However, further research is warranted, particularly to investigate the ‘Yes 
certainty’ model more rigorously. The limited number of observations hindered thorough testing 
of the ‘Yes certainty’ model in this study. 27
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Figure 1 Theoretical model of preference uncertainty.
Source: Adapted from O’ Reilly (1983) and Hogarth (1987).
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3 Efficiency score was calculated using the following formula: Efficiency =Difference between upper and lower CI 
over the Mean WTP. 36
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